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POSSESSION OF LAND BY THE GRANTOR AS NOTICE OF
HIS RIGHTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
Notice, one of the most important concepts in the law of conveyancing, has
great significance under Pennsylvania recording statutes. Those statutes provide that
a purchaser of land, previously conveyed by an unrecorded deed, may be protected
if he records his deed before the first deed is recorded: provided he is without
notice of this prior conveyance.1 This notice may be actual or constructive, and,
although the usual method of giving constructive notice is by recording the instrument of conveyance, possession of the land may also be considered notice to
2
subsequent purchasers.
This possession may be by the grantor, the grantee or by a stranger to the
original transfer. The scope of this article, however, will be restricted to possession
of the land by the grantor as notice of his rights, and with the exception of a few
introductory paragraphs, only the law in Pennsylvania will be considered.
Possession of the land, as already mentioned ,is ordinarily notice of the rights
6f the party in possession. There is, however, a well recognized exception to this
general rule where the grantor remains in possession after a conveyance. The majority of the cases throughout the country seem to favor the view that continued possession by the grantor after he has made a conveyance of the land is not sufficient
to put purchasers on inquiry as to any rights which he may have retained.3 The
reasoning in support of this view is that a purchaser "is justified in relying on the
title conferred by the deed-the inference being that the grantor's possession
is permissive.'
Nevertheless, a substantial minority of the cases hold that the general rule is
applicable in the case of possession by the grantor also. 5 It is argued that the grantor
has no more right to be in possession after the conveyance than a stranger has and
such retention of possession indicates that the grantor must have res'erved some
rights in the land, and thus, purchasers should be on inquiry as to such rights. 6
Even in those jurisdictions which would except from the general rule the continued possession by the grantor there are limitations placed on the exception. That
is to say, that if the grantor remains in possession an unreasonable length of time
such possession would apparently be sufficient to constitute notice. 7 Thus, it would
seem that the purchaser must at least inquire as to how long the grantor has been
in possession, and if the possession has been for more than a reasonable time, the
1 Act of 1925, as amended 1931, P.L. 558, 21 P.S. 351.
2 Allison v. Oligher, 141 Pa. Super. 201, 14 A.2d 569 (1940) ; Krein v. Steigerwald, 128 Pa. Super.

51, 193 A. 390 (1937).
' 105 A.L.R. 849 (anno.); 66 C.J. 1173, § 1019; 27 R.C.L. 728, § 492; 13 L.R.A.
N.S. 118.
4 Turman v. Bell, 15 S.W. 886. (This case is usually cited for giving the reasons on which the
divergent rules are based.)
5 See n. 3, supra.
6 See n. 4, supra.
'7 55 Am. Jur. 1095, § 725.

NOTES

purchaser is then put on inquiry as to any rights retained by the grantor. What is
a reasonable time will, of course, vary with the circumstances.
Thus, we have the rule that possession of land is notice of the possessor's
rights with the majority of courts making an exception in the case of possession by
the grantor.
What is the rule in Pennsylvania? Is possession of the land notice of the
grantor's rights or do the Pennsylvania courts follow the majority view on this
point? Unfortunately, the law in Pennsylvania is unsettled. There are few cases
on point and those few have come to different conclusions. There is authority for
holding either view. In a recent law review article8 it was said that whether or not
possession by the grantor is notice to subsequent purchasers is a "moot question."
Nothing since then has helped to clarify the situation.
In support of the view that possession by the grantor is not notice of his rights,
the earliest case on record in Pennsylvania is Scott v. Gallagher.9 The facts in that
case were quite interesting. Thomas Gallagher and his wife conveyed the premises
in question to one McCormick by a deed which was recorded. Then McCormick executed a bond to Gallagher, the condition of which was that McCormick was to
sell the land before the following February, and if it had not been sold by then,
he was to return the deed to Gallagher. The land was never sold, nor did McCormick
ever return the deed. Gallagher, however, remained in possession of the land and
those claiming under him had been in possession up until the time of the trial. Two
years after the date of the deed McCormick died bequeathing to Butler and wife
"all my property and estate." Butler and wife conveyed the land by recorded deed
to John Rittenhouse. He conveyed to Elizabeth R. Rittenhouse and, she having
died intestate, her heirs conveyed the land to Scott, the plaintiff.
The defendants claimed that their possession was notice to Scott and the whcle
world that Thomas Gallagher and those claiming under him were owners of the
equitable interest in the land. The court in holding that the possession by Gallagher
was not notice of any rights retained by him said there would be no hardship on
Gallagher because ".

.

. it was his own folly to place himself and others in the

power of McCormick." If anyone should suffer, says the court, it should be
Gallagher and not Scott-applying the age-old rule of equity that if one of two
innocent persons must suffer, he who has been the cause must bear the loss. The
court also said that since Scott lived in New Jersey and looked only to the deed
from Gallagher to McCormick which was recorded he is not bound to call on the
person in possession and ".

.

. inquire whether he has a secret agreement with the

owner of the legal title."
It is interesting to note that here possession of the grantor was for what would
8 44 Dick. L. Rev. 203.
9 Scott v. Gallagher, 14 S. & R. 333, 16 Am. Dec. 508 (1826).
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seem to be an unreasonable length of time. Yet the court made no mention of it.10
Furthermore, the court emphasized the fact that the deed from Gallagher to
McCormick was recorded. Although it did not say what the result would have been
if this deed had not been recorded, the reasonable implication would be that if
the deed was not recorded, the purchaser would certainly have been required to
make inquiry as to the rights of the grantor inpossession.
In Woods v. Farmere** the court indicated by dictum that possession of the
grantor is not sufficient notice to put purchasers on inquiry as to his rights. Here the
possession was not by the grantor, but the court said that the possession of land is
notice of the possessor's title but the registry by him of a particular title would restrict the generality of notice from possession. This would seem to apply to a grantor
who, while remaining in possession, allows a deed to be put on record showing
that he has conveyed the land. Recording of the original deed is again given great
weight.
The court in another case, Rowe v. Ream, 12 said by dicta that possession of
the grantor is not notice of his rights. Title was originally in Davis. The plaintiff
put in evidence a deed from Davis and wife to Henry Bennethum in fee simple
and a mortgage from Bennethum to the plaintiff. The defendant, Rowe, said
she gave Bennethum $300 to purchase the lot in question. He took the deed in his
own name. A house was built on the land and she took possession and remained in
possession up to the time of the trial. She showed that the plantiff knew she
was in possession at the time of the mortgage and that there was from the facts
stated a resulting trust in her favor and that the plaintiff had notice of such trust.
The court distinguished this case from Scott v. Gallagher in that there was
an express trust in that case of which there was no record and it "... represents a
class of cases in which possession by a beneficiary without more is insufficient to
affect an otherwise bona fide purchaser for value." The plaintiff offered to prove
that Bennethum was a trustee ex maleficio by reason of his taking the conveyance
to himself in fraud of her rights. The court said: "She did not appearin the line of
title as a former owner who had conveyed her interest and hence it was the duty
of the mortgagee to ascertain by what rights she was in possession." (Italics mine).
The court also quotes from AicCulloch v. Cowler1 s to the effect that ". . . possession
of land is notice to the world of every right under which the occupant claims it
unless he has put a title on record inconsistent with his possession. . ." (Italics
mine.) Once again the fact that the original deed was recorded is deemed of great
importance.
In the case of Stiffler v. Retzloff 14 it was held that.possession of the grantor
was not notice. Here John H. Stiffler conveyed to his son one-half of a lot in
10 But see 32 Iowa L. Rev. 166 at 170 where the author says "It would seem, however, that the
requirement of inquiry is a reasonable one, and that a purchaser would not be bound to discover
a secret reservation of interest in the grantor-possessor.'--citing Scott v. Gallagher (see n. 9, supra).
11 Woods v. Farmere, 7 Watts 382, 32 Am. Dec. 772 (1838).
12 Rowe v. Ream, 105 Pa. 543 (1884).
18 McCulloch v. Cowler, 5 Watts & S. 427 (1843).
14 Stiffler v. Retzloff, 7 Sadler 232, 11 A. 876 (1887).
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Altoona. This deed was recorded. The parties then entered into a written agreement that a certain portion of the land mentioned in the deed should not pass. This
agreement was never recorded. The following year the son made an assignment
for the benefit of creditors, and the plaintiff purchased from the assignee the lot
which had been conveyed to the son by the father. It was held that the plaintiff
was not affected by the unrecorded agreement and that the grantor's possession
of the part in controversy did not put him on inquiry as to any rights of the grantor.
The court made no mention of the length of time the grantor was in possession, but
as it was for only a year it is possible that this would be held to be a reasonable
time. Here, too, the deed was recorded. 15
.

.

.0

.

On the other hand there are cases on record holding that possession of land
6
by the grantor is notice of his rights. One such case is Hood v. Fabnestock' where
it is held so impliedly, possession being held by a tenant of the grantor. However,
it is generally held that possession of a tenant is constructive notice of both his
rights and his landlord's rights. 17 It appears that there was a fraudulent conveyance
in this case after which conveyance the fraudulent grantor retained possession of
the land exercising every act of ownership over it, holding the premises by his
tenant. The issue was whether the defendant who was a purchaser at a sheriff's sale
under a judgment against the fraudulent grantee had notice of this fraudulent
transaction.
The court said that in order to protect creditors who are not in default and
who have no other means of protection it should be the imperative duty of the
purchaser of real estate to make diligent inquiry as to the state of the title of his
vendor. The court in a statement, which is an express contradiction to the statement made in Scott v. Gallagher,"8 said: "It is nothing to the purpose that Hood
(the purchaser) lives at a distance from the property for this cannot excuse him from
making the proper inquiries."
This was an unusually strong case for allowing such possession to constitute
notice. First of all, the possession was by a tenant of the grantor who was in fact
a stranger to the conveyance, and the purchaser should certainly have been put on
inquiry as to his rights, and, having discovered that he was a tenant, the identification and the rights claimed by the landlord of said tenant. In addition, this was
a fraudulent conveyance in which the rights of innocent creditors were involved.
Although the court did not say whether the rule would be applied only when the
grantor remains in possession, it may well be that it is limited to that situation.
In the case of Jaques v. Weeks 19 there was a deed of the land in question
15 See 66 C.J. 1172, § 1019 where it is said: "In other jurisdictions the continued possession of

a prior vendor after his conveyance is regarded as an exception to the general rule that possession
of land is notice of the possessor's rights. This is especially true where the deed to the purchaser
is recorded."-citing Stiffler v. Retzloff.
16 Hood v. Fahnestock, 1 Pa. 470, 44 Am. Dec. 147 (1845).
17 U.S. v. Sliney, 21 Fed. 894 (1884).
18 See n. 9, supra.
1s Jaques v. Weeks, 7 Watts 261 (1838).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEWV

VOL. 57

which was recorded and an unrecorded deed of defeasance. The grantor was still
in possession when he later sold the land to the defendant. The plaintiffs purchased
the land from the original grantee.
The court held the recorded deed and the unrecorded deed of defeasance to
be one transaction which was in the nature of a mortgage, and, since the deed of
defeasance was not recorded, it was considered an unrecorded mortgage. In holding
that the purchaser did not have notice of the unrecorded mortgage, the court said
that such possession was ".

.

. notice of the title of the possessor but not of every

fact which might have been learned by him." It was held that Jaques bought a fce
simple subject to the defeasance and liable to the equity of redemption. So this
court would seem to say that possession of the land by the grantor is notice of his
(laim of title but not notice of all facts which might have been learned by inquiry.
In Brooke v. Bordner2" the facts were these:
One, Noll had purchased land at a sale but when the deed was executed and delivered it was made out to Bordner with the understanding that as soon as the
notes upon which Bordner was security were paid, he was to deed the property over
to Noll, the actual owner. The court said that "as his (Noll's) possession was
enough to put Brooke upon inquiry, the latter took subject to Noll's equity."
There was no mention made as to whether or not the deed to Bordner was
recorded. Furthermore, it should be noted that this was not actually possession by
the grantor but rather possession by the actual owner. By its silence on the matter
the court seemingly indicated that whether or not the original deed was recorded
would be of no significance.
In 1951 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered another case with similar
facts. This was in Malamed v. Sedelsky2' where real estate had been bought by the
Sedelskys, but the property was put in the name of Pastner, a brother-in-law in
order to take advantage of his status as a veteran. The deed to Pastner was recorded
and two years later he delivered a deed for the premises to the Sedelskys. However,
after the delivery of this deed but before it was recorded, Pastn'er executed a
judgment note to the plaintiff on which judgment was entered before the recording
of the deed.
The court said that possession of the premises by the Sedelskys from the time
Pastner took title to the time of the trial was sufficient constructive notice, "for it
has been long settled that it is the duty of a purchaser of real property to make
inquiry respecting the rights of the party in possession and failing to do so he is
affected with constructive notice of such facts as would have come to his knowledge
in the proper discharge of that duty."
Here, again, two factors should be pointed out. First; this is not an actual
case of the grantor remaining in possession. secondly, the deed to Pastner was
recorded. Nevertheless, from the facts, it would seem that possession in this case
should constitute notice.
Brooke v. Bordner, 125 Pa. 470, 17 A. 467 (1889).
21 Malamed v. Sedelsky, 367 Pa. 353 (1951).
20

NOTES

The court in Blight v. Schenck 22 without any discussion made the flat statement that
the grantor remained in possession which of itself served to put
the purchaser on inquiry." However, in this case the deed was held void, and so the
case was not actually decided on the theory of possession being constructive notice.
"...

There are no recent Pennsylvania cases on point,2 8 but the recent decisions
in other jurisdictions seem to favor almost unanimously the view that possession
of the grantor is not notice of his rights and it is the opinion of this writer that
this is the better view-with certain qualifications.
As to what the rule is in Pennsylvania or what it will be when the question
comes up again is a matter of conjecture. It is the opinion of this writer that such
cases should be decided upon their own individual facts rather than by a strict rule
of law.
Recognizing the need for predictability in law, however, it is suggested
that the rule of law in Pennsylvania should be, and probably will be, that possession
of the land by the grantor is not notice of his rights, subject to the following qualifications:
(1) There seems to be no doubt that if the original deed was not
recorded, possession by the grantor would be notice of his rights. Without a deed to his vendor to rely on on record the purchaser should be
bound to take notice of who is in possession of the land and inquire as
to the possessor's rights.
(2) Even if the original deed is recorded, however, if the grantor
has been in possession for more than a reasonable time, his possession
may be enough to constitute notice. This is a desirable result since the
presumption that the grantor's possession is merely at the sufferance of
the grantee would seem to be rebutted by the fact that the grantor remains
in possession a long time. This would place on the vendee the duty
of making a Peasonable investigation as to the grantor's claim.
(3) If the possession is by a third person, a stranger to the original
transaction who is in fact a tenant of the grantor, it would seem that the
purchaser should inquire as to his rights. Therefore, since possession of
a tenant is notice of his landlord's rights, such possession by the grantor's
tenant should constitute notice of the grantor's rights.
(4) In more doubtful cases, the court may apply the equity doctrine
that where one of two innocent persons must suffer, it should be the
one who caused the loss. -This will in most cases be the grantor.
Joseph W. Mullin
Member of the Senior Class
22 Blight v. Schenck, 10 Pa. 285 at 295 (1849).
28 But see Allison v. Oligher (op. cit., n. 2) where the court said:
"Visible possession is notice of title sufficient to put purchasers from common source
of title on notice and require inquiry upon their part."
See also Krein v. Steigerwald (op. cit., n. 2) where the court said:
"Possession of land is notice of every title under which the occupant claims the land
unless the occupant has put a title on record inconsistent with his possession."
Note the similarity in language between this case and McCulloch v. Cowler (op. cit. n. 13).

